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Ali Baba as Political Allegory
by MASHA SALAZKINA
Abstract: This essay considers the history of Soviet Indian coproductions focusing on Ali 
Baba and 40 Thieves (1980) as a political allegory over the fate of the multination state. 
It addresses the formal utopian character of the fi lm and the excessive threat of sexual 
violence in the song-and-dance numbers.
T
he subject of  this essay is the little studied phenomenon of  the Soviet-Indian 
cinematic coproductions. While giving a general outline of  the history of  these 
coproductions, I focus primarily on the most commercially successful of  these 
joint efforts, Ali Baba and 40 Thieves (Alibaba Aur 40 Chor/Priklyucheniya Ali-Baby 
i soroka razboinikov, Latif  Faiziyev and Umesh Mehra, 1980), henceforward Alibaba.
I argue that the fi lm contains a political allegory expressing anxiety over the fate of  
the multination state; that anxiety lies beneath the formal utopian character of  the 
fi lm, which attempts to show the constitution of  a new community on the screen 
and to defi ne the role of  its political subject in the face of  crime and governmental 
corruption. I will address these issues through discussing the directors’ choice of  the 
material (a story from One Thousand and One Nights, or The Arabian Nights, as it is better 
known in English); the narrative structure of  the fi lm; performance histories of  the 
Indian and Soviet actors; and, fi nally, through a reading of  the excessive threat of  
sexual violence concentrated in the fi lm’s song-and-dance numbers. Alibaba, I con-
tend, is of  interest not only due to the formal and institutional hybridization of  two 
autonomous cinematic traditions, Indian and Soviet, but also as a cultural object 
which displays a shared anxiety over the role of  the state as its existing political and 
economic order moves palpably toward the brink of  collapse.
The Film. Alibaba was cowritten and codirected by a team of  Soviet (mostly Central 
Asian) and Indian fi lm makers as a coproduction between Uzbekfi lm (USSR) and 
Eagle Films (India); the picture was shot on locations in Buhkara and on sets in 
India. In fact, the fi lm’s credits show a careful adherence to the principle of  almost 
equal participation from both countries, following the principle that was established 
Masha Salazkina is the author of  In Excess: Eisenstein’s Mexico (University of  Chicago Press, 2008). She is cur-
rently working on a new project, an international history of  political modernism and fi lm theory.
AU: Is the title correct as written in bio? It’s listed as In Excess: Sergei Eisenstein’s Mexico online.) 
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during the fi rst wave of  Indo-Soviet coproductions in the 1950s: script, direction, set 
design, cast, and even music involved cineastes from both countries.1 The director 
on the Soviet side was an Uzbekistani, Latif  Faiziyev, whose career stretched back to 
the 1950s, beginning with solid socialist realist productions such as On the Way Traced 
by Lenin (Po Putevke Lenina, 1957) and moving toward national epics of  the Soviet re-
publics. He apprenticed as an assistant director to the celebrated pair of  Soviet fi lm-
makers Aleksandr Alov and Vladimir Naumov on their 1951 adaptation of  Nikolai 
Gogol’s Ukrainian national classic, Taras Shevchenko. Thus “imprinted” by his back-
ground and training, Faiziyev incorporated the tropes of  Socialist Realism and the 
highly theatrical monumental style of  1950s Soviet cinema into the making of  “the-
matic” fi lms celebrating the national heritage of  the Central Asian republics (The Fall 
of  the Emirates/Krushenie emirata, 1955; The Star of  Ulugbek/Zvezda ulugbeka, 1964). Along 
the way, he directed a minor Soviet-Indian coproduction, Eastward, Beyond the Ganges 
(Voshod nad Gangom, 1975). Location scouting for that fi lm, Faiziyev made contacts with 
the Indian team he was later to use for Alibaba.2 Thus Faiziyev’s background must have 
seemed right for helming a bigger Indo-Soviet production: he’d shown himself  to be 
an ideologically reliable representative of  the Soviet Asian republics, already familiar 
with Indian cinema. And his touch is certainly evident in some of  the idiosyncratic 
elements of  the fi lm, in particular its peculiar mixture of  socialist realist tropes with 
folkloric elements and the antirealist conventions of  Indian popular cinema. Faiziyev’s 
Indian counterpart was Umesh Mehra, whose only feature up to that date was a ro-
mantic family comedy, Hamare Tumhare (1979). He was nonetheless touted in Soviet 
publicity as “one of  the most successful commercial fi lm-makers in India.”3 In fact, he 
got a head start in Indian fi lm as the son of  F. C. Mehra, head of  Eagle Films (which 
produced Alibaba) and assistant to Shammi Kapoor.4
If  neither director was a household name in his respective country, the actors they 
had to work with were some of  the most celebrated Soviet and Indian stars. On the 
Soviet side, these included Rolan Bykov, who was not only one of  the most important 
actors of  the postwar Soviet Union but was also noted as a director of  eccentric and 
experimental children’s fi lms; Sofi ko Chiaureli from Georgia, well-known from Tengiz 
Abuladze’s and Sergei Paradjanov’s fi lms; and Frunze Mkrtchyan, an Armenian actor 
and a star of  many of  the 1960s–1970s Soviet comedies. On the Indian side, the fi lm 
stars Dharmendra in the role of  Ali Baba, and Hema Malini and Zeenat Aman in 
the two leading female roles. Dharmendra and Hema Malini were the star Bollywood 
couple of  the 1970s and well-known in the Soviet Union after the 1975 release of  
Sholay (Ramesh Sippy, 1975), one of  the highest grossing Bollywood fi lms of  all times 
both in India and abroad. Hema Malini conquered Soviet audiences in her double 
performance (playing the two roles of  the twins separated at birth) in Zita and Gita (Seeta 
1 Olga Zlotnik, “Tales Recognize No Boundaries,” Soviet Film 11 (1979): 4.
2 Mikhail Sulkin, “Old Tale Revisited,” Soviet Film 4 (1980): 9.
3 I. Zvyagintseva, “Sovmestnye sovetsko-indiiskie fi l’my,” Kino Indii (Moskva: Iskusstvo, 1988), 285.
4 Eagle Films corporate profi le, http://www.eaglefi lmsindia.com/profi le_umeshmehra.htm (accessed September 10, 
2009).
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Aur Geeta, Ramesh Sippy, 1972), a fi lm that was released in the Soviet Union in 1976 
and surpassed Sholay in its popularity, with a recorded audience of  55.2 million.5 The 
other major presence was that of  Zeenat Aman who had just starred in the hugely suc-
cessful Satyam Shivam Sundaram (Raj Kapoor, 1978) and earlier in Hare Rama Hare Krishna 
(Dev Anand, 1971), both of  which were released in the Soviet Union. Zeenat Aman’s 
role in Alibaba prefi gures the motif  of  the avenging woman which became widespread 
in 1980s and 1990s Indian popular cinema, to which she also contributed when she 
played the rape victim in B. R. Chopra’s Insaaf  Ka Tarazu (1980). As the Bollywood 
industry is famously star-driven, the presence of  these fi rst-class stars was an important 
indication that this coproduction was intended to be a major cinematic event as well as 
a commercial success, which it indeed proved to be.
Why focus on this fi lm out of  a dozen other Soviet-Indian coproductions? A brief  
history of  Indo-Soviet productions from the 1950s to the 1990s will elucidate the par-
ticular importance of  Alibaba. While Alibaba may be the best remembered of  Soviet-
Indian coproductions, it by no means stands alone.
Indo-Soviet Coproductions.  The history of  Soviet-Indian cinematic ties goes back 
to the 1950s when the Soviet Union was courting neutralist India. As part of  this ef-
fort, a delegation of  fi lmmakers and offi cials, including director Vsevolod Pudovkin 
and actor Nikolai Cherkasov, was sent on an offi cial cultural visit. The trip resulted 
in the fi rst Indian-Soviet exchange of  fi lms, which is how Russian audiences came 
to catch their fi rst glimpse of  Indian fi lm culture.6 However, real exchange between 
India and the Soviet Union had to wait until after de-Stalinization when, as Sudha 
Rajagopalan has explained, Indian festivals began taking place in the Soviet Union, 
leading to the very successful booking of  Indian fi lms in Soviet theaters. Nehru’s stance 
of  nonalignment was favored by Khrushchev, which led to a quasi-alignment lasting 
to the very end of  the Soviet period. Ties were further strengthened when America 
under Nixon tilted toward Pakistan and China in the 1970s. Paradoxically, Indian 
cinema—auteur and commercial alike—was initially received in the Soviet Union as 
part of  the larger neorealist turn in postwar fi lm cultures. Neorealism for the Soviet 
cinema of  the Thaw meant an emphasis on individual experiences, emotions, and 
ultimately the sphere of  the private rather than the public and the political, which is 
something Indian “melodramas” (as they were often referred to) provided.7 Crowning 
the fi rst offi cial visit of  Indian fi lmmakers to the USSR in 1954 (the Indian delegation 
included writer/director K. A. Abbas, director Bimal Roy, and actor/director Raj 
Kapoor, all important fi gures in the nascent Indian fi lm industry who would prove to 
be instrumental to all the future Indo-Soviet coproductions) was an offi cial proclama-
tion of  “friendship and cooperation between the cinemas of  the two countries,” which 
5 Sudha Rajagopalan, Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas: The Culture of Movie-Going After Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2008), 183.
6 Ibid.
7 Rajagopalan, “Emblematic of the Thaw: Early Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas,” South Asian Popular Culture 4, no. 2 
(2006): 83–100.
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in practical terms meant the lessening of  barriers to the import/export of  Indian and 
Soviet fi lms in each country and the possibility of  binational fi lm coproduction These 
coproductions were meant to create fi lms that would hybridize each culture’s favored 
motifs and narrative structures, in the hopes of  creating truly popular fi lms. Accord-
ingly, both countries would have equal representation in all functions, including two 
directors, two scriptwriters, and popular Soviet and Indian actors, in order to “fuse 
the cinematic and pictorial traditions of  both fi lm industries.”8 Most Soviet-Indian 
coproductions, including Alibaba, followed this model. K. A. Abbas and Vasili Pronin 
directed the fi rst Soviet-Indian coproduction, Pardesi/Khozhdenie za tri morya in 1957. It 
was nominated for Cannes’s Palme d’Or Award in 1958 and remains the most criti-
cally acclaimed of  the coproductions. It was based on the travels of  a fi fteenth-century 
Russian merchant to India, and featured such big stars as Nargis and Oleg Strizhenov. 
It was followed by Black Mountain (Chernaya gora; M. S. Sathyu and Aleksandr Zguridi, 
1971) and Rikki Tikki Tavi (Zguridi, 1975), based on Kipling’s story. The next copro-
duction was Faiziyev’s Voshod nad Gangom (1975), which reversed the story of  Pardesi and 
attempted to follow many of  its techniques, but proved to be a failure both critically 
and commercially.9 As is evident from their literary sources, these coproductions relied 
either on mythological/folkloric or Colonial heritage and stayed away from contem-
porary issues. Standing apart is Raj Kapoor’s fi lm My Name Is Joker (Mera Naam Joker, 
1970); an Indian fi lm made with the participation of  Soviet actors and partly shot on 
locations in Moscow, it is best seen in the context of  Kapoor’s own oeuvre. Surrounded 
by fi nancial and political scandals, the fi lm had mixed reception both in India and in 
the USSR.10
While none of  the coproductions following Pardesi managed to achieve much vis-
ibility, by the 1970s it had become clear that Soviet audiences fully embraced com-
mercial Indian cinema with its stars and its aesthetic formula, making Indian fi lms 
profi table at the same time that the audience for Soviet fi lms was declining. At the 
time when Indian popular cinema shifted away from the social and political issues of  
the 1960s toward entertainment-driven cinema in the 1970s (with less explicit social 
and political themes), the Soviet Union increased its import of  Indian popular cinema 
in order to generate revenues for Soviet distributors.11 Such was the trend toward en-
tertainment that each copy of  an imported Indian hit was shown on average two and 
a half  times more extensively than that of  its Soviet competitors.12 Notably, Alibaba 
marks the turning point from the more ideologically oriented coproductions toward 
entertainment cinema, designed to follow the crowd-pleasing conventions of  contem-
porary Bollywood.
In fact, unlike earlier Soviet-Indian coproductions, Alibaba proved to be a fi nan-
cial success in both India and the Soviet Union. In India it reached “Silver Jubilee” 
 8 E. T. Ermash, “Novyi etap sovetsko-indiiskogo sotrudnichestva i sodruzhestva kinematografi i,” Iskusstvo kino 4 
(1981): 150.
 9 Zvyagintseva, “Sovmestnye sovetsko-indiiskie fi l’my,” 279–286.
10 Rajagopalan, Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas, 88.
11 Ibid., 66–98.
12 Viktor Filimonov, “Zachem my khodim za tri morya?” Iskusstvo kino 6 (1990): 126.
AU: Used the spelling listed online for this 
director from the actual fi lm listing, Vasili Pronin, 
Khozhdenie za tri morya and Strizhenov. OK?)
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status, running for twenty-fi ve weeks continuously in all major centers all over 
India.13 In the Soviet Union it was an even bigger hit: its recorded viewer turnout in 
1980 was 52.8 million. Of  the large number of  Indian popular movie imports into 
the Soviet Union that played to audiences of  over 20 million, only four Indian fi lms 
before Alibaba had a higher audience turnout (Awara, Raj Kapoor, 1954; Bobby, Raj 
Kapoor, 1973; Seeta Aur Gita, Ramesh Sippy, 1972; and Barood, (Pramod Chakra-
vorty, 1976), and only one other Indian fi lm was to surpass it (Disco Dancer, Babbar 
Subhash, 1983).14 In addition to its commercial success, the fi lm was awarded the 
Grand Prix from UNICEF/UNESCO Children’s Films Festival in Belgrade.15 Un-
like the earlier coproductions such as Pardesi or Mera Naam Joker, Soviet participation 
in Alibaba was not emphasized and it was largely received as a domestic fi lm.16 At 
the same time, as it was based on a classic/folk-story type of  fairy tale, in the Soviet 
Union the fi lm was exempted from the prevailing ideological pressures of  “realism,” 
instead fi tting into the long history of  stylistically fl amboyant Soviet fairy-tale adap-
tations (such as Ptushko’s famous fi lms). Ultimately though, the key to its success was 
its star power and music. Unlike Holly wood fi lms, which depended more heavily 
on original scores, Soviet fi lms relied on the use of  songs (instead or in addition to 
leitmotifs and orchestral scoring) in their sound tracks.17 This made the song-and-
dance convention of  Indian popular cinema work particularly well in the Soviet 
context. Indeed, there was an active and growing Soviet fan base for Indian stars in 
the 1970s, as evidenced by articles in the popular fi lm magazine Sovetskii ekran (Soviet 
Screen).18 In fact, Alibaba ushered in a decade of  commercial Indian fi lm dominance 
in the USSR, while the Tashkent fi lm festival (a major vehicle for “progressive” cin-
emas of  Asia, Africa, and Latin America) increased the number of  noncommercial 
Indian fi lms (known as “parallel cinema”) it accepted in a futile attempt to counter 
the ever-increasing popularity of  Bollywood fi lms. It is notable that in 1982, at the 
Seventh Annual Tashkent International Film Festival, Alibaba was repeatedly refer-
enced in the symposium on the topic of  coproductions, even as Indian fi lmmakers 
were arguing for a turn toward the present and confronting the contemporary issues 
facing both countries.19
On the basis of  its success, Alibaba was followed with another fi lm made by the 
same team, with some of  the same stars, popular musical numbers, and similar 
mythological/folkloric/epic literary origins. This time it was a popular Punjabi 
medieval poetic legend, Sohni Mahiwal (Legenda o lyubvi, Umesh Mehra and Latif  
Faiziyev, 1984), starring Dharmendra’s son Sunny Deol. Mehra went on to make a 
13 Eagle Films corporate profi le.
14 Statistics quoted in Rajagopalan, Indian Films in Soviet Cinemas, 182–183.
15 Ermash, “Novyi etap sovetsko-indiiskogo sotrudnichestva i sodruzhestva kinematografi i,” 152.
16 In fact, to this day you can buy the fi lm in the Indian section of a DVD store without any indication of its coproduced 
status.
17 Andrei Pavlovich Petrov and Natal’ia Kolesnikova, Dialog o kinomuzyke (Moskva: Iskusstvo, 1982), 20.
18 In turn, the success of the fi lm led to another series of articles about all the stars of Alibaba. See O. Ferbenko, 
“Dharmendra,” Sovetskii ekran 18 (1981): 15–17; and Iu. Korchagov, “Indiia: Hema Malini,” Sovetskii ekran 6 
(1984): 19 Gosti nashikh ekranov: Zeenat Aman,” Sovetskii ekran 16 (1985): 22.
19 L. Budiak, “Ukrepliaia druzhbu i sotrudnichestvo,” Iskusstvo kino 11 (1982): 151.
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number of  action fi lms in India in the 1980s, many starring Mithun Chakraborty, 
the enormously popular star of  Disco Dancer, which gained a cult status among the 
lovers of  Indian cinema in the Soviet Union. With Mithun in tow, Faiziyev and 
Mehra attempted a more “contemporary” topic with their last coproduction, Shikari 
(Po zakonu dzhunglei, 1991). It was a love story centered on an elephant tamer and 
a Russian circus actress, but next to Mithun’s other fi lms it passed unnoticed. The 
fi nal success of  the coproductions made in Alibaba’s wake was Ajooba (Chernyj Prints 
Adzhuba, 1991) starring Amitabh Bachchan and codirected by Shashi Kapoor and 
Gennadi Vasilyev.20 The only other coproduction made in the Soviet times, a docu-
mentary fi lm about the life of  Nehru, was barely screened either in India or in the 
Soviet Union.21
Having unpacked the place of  Alibaba in the history of  Soviet-Indian coproduc-
tions, we can now turn from historical background to textual analysis of  the fi lm it-
self  and a broader argument about the fi lm’s signifi cance. The question which most 
interests me here is, given the ideological and commercial pressures on Soviet-Indian 
coproductions, how can we make sense of  the negotiation of  these tensions and con-
fl icting ideologies through the text of  the fi lm? I argue that at the core of  the fi lm is an 
implicit rejection of  the modern, liberal, Eurocentric concept of  the nation-state, and 
the problem of  constituting another symbolically unifi ed utopian community is put 
in its place. On the surface, the fi lm formulates the legitimizing ideal of  the powerful 
populist state, which was the self-image that both the Soviet Union and India pro-
moted. But even as the fi lm is organized to fi t the offi cial ideology, it displays powerful 
contradictions and anxieties that lie behind such a state organization. These anxie-
ties are most directly manifested in the fi gurative status of  the “false” versus “true” 
fathers, and in the representation of  the rebellion of  the “daughters” as a response 
to the constant threat of  sexual violence and symbolic objectifi cation (economic and 
sexual, often at once). Their rebellion is potentially subversive of  both the patriarchal 
state (they refuse the role of  dependent) and commodity culture (they refuse the role 
of  object of  exchange). While the conventional ending neutralizes both anxieties, the 
narrative logic of  the fi lm necessarily depends on the possibility not only of  exterior 
threat from criminals or paramilitaries but also of  a libidinal threat from within, from 
the daughters. While not contradicting in any way the pleasures Soviet and Indian au-
diences derived from the fi lm, the existence of  such threats complicates the issue of  the 
ideological import of  entertainment cinema,22 which can only be understood within 
the context of  the complex geopolitical nexus in which Alibaba was situated. What is 
implicitly at stake here, then, is the question of  how coproductions manage to serve 
heterogeneous ideological needs.
Coproductions between various national fi lm industries have been very common 
in the history of  cinema, and yet they are rarely considered from the point of  view of  
20 A. Sealov, “Chernyi princ Adzhuba,” Sovetskii ekran 4 (1989): 8–9.
21 Zvyagintseva, “Sovmestnye sovetsko-indiiskie fi l’my,” 286.
22 Here I am thinking in particular of the work done by Richard Dyer and Fredric Jameson. See, for example, Fredric 
Jameson, “Reifi cation and Utopia in Mass Culture,” Social Text 1 (1979): 130–148; and Richard Dyer, Only Enter-
tainment (London: Routledge, 1992).
AU: Please see note regarding this spelling in 
note 20, Chernyj
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their inherently double aspect.23 Highly complex ideological negotiations take place 
in such a hybrid form. Alibaba is unique precisely because it was successful at bringing 
together the seemingly confl icting commercial and ideological demands of  both the 
Soviet and Indian state, the ultimate backers of  the project. Thus, Alibaba presents us 
with more theoretically interesting issues than it may seem to at fi rst. For instance, it 
can be seen in the context of  the site-specifi c issue of  the Soviet “blockbuster”24—fi lms 
oriented toward a “mass audience” such as musicals and action fi lms which began to 
emerge in the Soviet cinema in the 1970s and early 1980s as a response to failing prof-
its and the fragmentation of  the fi lm-viewing public.25 Despite apparently belonging 
to a different generic category (fairy tale/adventure), Alibaba can also be viewed as one 
of  the examples of  the transition of  Indian popular cinema toward the bandit and 
avenging women fi lms of  the 1980s.26 The question I am most concerned with here, 
however, is how form can meet such complex and multifaceted ideological, geopoliti-
cal, and commercial demands within two separate fi lmgoing cultures.
A brief  turn to the literary origins of  the fi lm in relation to the contemporary 
Soviet-Indian geopolitical situation provides some clues as to the variety of  issues at 
stake, as well as their fi ctional solutions.
The Background: The Thousand and One Nights.  “Ali Baba and Forty Thieves” 
is a story from The Arabian Nights; it is a literary artifact whose origins are hotly de-
bated. Even the debates are hotly debated, as the scholarship is often vulnerable to the 
charges of  bias made in Edward Said’s Orientalism. What the scholars agree on is that 
the stories in the collection as it fi rst appeared in the West may be traced to Arabic-
Islamic as well as Indian, Persian, and Greek cultures. The tales underwent constant 
transformation over the course of  centuries so that the “origins” of  the collection as 
well as its “original textual form” became part of  the myth.27 The stories themselves, 
many of  them travel narratives, absorb motifs and vernaculars from the many differ-
ent cultural and geographic areas they span. The story of  Ali Baba in particular only 
23 More work has been done on issues of national identity, transnationality and/or globalization. See Tim Bergfelder, 
International Adventures: Popular German Cinema and European Co-Productions in the 1960s (Oxford and New 
York: Berghahn, 2005) and “The Nation Vanishes: European Co-productions and Popular Genre Formula in the 
1950s and 1960s,” Cinema and Nation, eds. Mette Hjort and Scott MacKenzie (New York: Routledge, 2000), 
139–153; Laura Podalsky, “Negotiating Differences: National Cinemas and Co-Productions in Pre-Revolutionary 
Cuba,” The Velvet Light Trap 34 (1994): 59–70; Teresa Hoefert de Turegano, “The International Politics of Cin-
ematic Coproduction: Spanish Policy in Latin America,” Film & History: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Film and 
Television Studies 34, no. 2 (2004): 15–24; and Mark Betz, “The Name Above the Subtitle: Language, Copro-
duction, Transnationalism,” in Beyond the Subtitle: Remapping European Art Cinema (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2009), 45–92.
24 On this topic, see Birgit Beumers, “Soviet and Russian Blockbusters: A Question of Genre?” Slavic Review 62, 
no. 3 (2003): 441–454.
25 Joshua First, “From Spectatorship to ‘Differentiated’ Consumer: Film Audience Research in the Era of Developed 
Socialism (1965–1980)” Kritika 9, no. 2 (2008): 317–344.
26 See Lalitha Gopalan, Cinema of Interruptions: Action Genres in Contemporary Indian Cinema (London: British Film 
Institute, 2002).
27 Wen-chin Ouyang, “Foreword: Genres, Ideologies, Genre Ideologies and Narrative Transformations,” in New Per-
spectives on Arabian Nights: Ideological Variations and Narrative Horizons, eds. Wen-chin Ouyang and Geert Jan 
van Gelder (New York: Routledge, 2005), ix–xv.
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appears in the eighteenth-century French translation by Antoine Galland. Galland did 
have a Syrian informant, a Maronite named Hanna Diab, who told Galland stories 
as well, so it is possible Ali Baba comes from this source.28 On the other hand, as no 
one has been able to locate the story in any form in any earlier Arabic manuscript, 
many scholars attribute the tale to Galland himself. However, as Madeleine Dobie has 
argued, Galland’s translation itself  is best understood as a cultural encounter refl ecting 
the heterogeneity of  the text.29 Whatever its origins, Ali Baba quickly became one of  
the most popular and recognized stories from The Arabian Nights.30 The fi rst movie 
of  the Ali Baba story was made in 1902 by Thomas Edison, and it has since become 
a staple for the Western Orientalist genre in European and American cinema. It has 
also been translated onto the screen many times in Indian cinema, including a recent 
Tamil version. The general outline of  the story is then familiar and instantly recogniz-
able to audiences around the world (an important consideration for the Bollywood 
Industry, which exports its fi lms worldwide, sometimes without subtitles or with sub-
titles in English only). While in the West most of  the fi lm’s renditions were directed 
at young audiences (as was also the case in the Soviet Union), Indian popular cinema 
rarely makes this kind of  age-based distinction. In addition, the stories of  The Arabian 
Nights provide a perfect narrative structure and stylistic choice for a Bollywood fi lm, 
since they include romantic motifs and comedy mixed with adventure, and they even 
pre sent inserts and comments in verse, comparable to the music numbers in a fi lm.
This generic and stylistic hybridity fi t in well with the reinvention and reinvigora-
tion of  popular Soviet fi lm in the 1970s, which saw an abundance of  highly stylized 
comedies, musicals, costume dramas, literary adaptations, science fi ction, and chil-
dren’s fi lms in an attempt to retain the audience with entertainment. These fi lms often 
placed particular emphasis on nonrepresentational, or self-consciously conventional, 
qualities. And by the 1970s, Soviet cinema was clearly divided between “popular” and 
auteur fi lms, paralleling a similar development in India. In addition, Hollywood con-
tinuity editing rules and generic classifi cation, which Bollywood style violates, never 
took hold in popular or auteur-driven Soviet cinema, therefore making Indian popular 
fi lm aesthetics less startling to the Soviet audiences. Given Soviet cinema’s long history 
of  stylistically fl amboyant fairy-tale adaptations, the fi gure of  Ali Baba as a good-
hearted simpleton—Dharmendra’s trademark of  the 1970s, which was a transposi-
tion of  his roles in the “socials” of  the 1960s, such as Anupama (Hrishikesh Mukherjee, 
1966)—resonated with the Russian folk tradition of  a simple peasant hero, linking 
the two fi lm iconographies. Seen in its historical context, the turn to the Arabian 
Nights as a mythological instance of  a pan-Asian culture implicitly affi rming the unity 
between the Central Asian Soviet Republics and India has sinister overtones in the 
context of  the Soviet Invasion of  Afghanistan with which the making of  the fi lm coin-
cided. By the late 1970s, the relations between the USSR and India were particularly 
28 Heinz Grotzfeld, Dreihundert Jahre 1001 Nacht in Europa: ein Begleitheft zur Ausstellung in Munster, Tubingen 
und Gotha (Munster: LIT Verlag 2005), 13.
29 Madeleine Dobie, “Translation in the Contact Zone: Antoine Galland’s Mille et une nuits: contes arabes,” in The 
Arabian Nights in Historical Context: Between East and West, eds. Saree Makdisi and Felicity Nussbaum (London: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 25–51.
30 Robert Irwin, The Arabian Nights: A Companion (London: I. B. Tauris & Co., 2004), 17–18.
AU: Used the spelling listed online for the actual 
fi lm listing, Hrishikesh Mukherjee. OK?)
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close, offi cially conducted through the rhetoric of  Indira Ghandi’s commitment to 
socialism, while in practical terms primarily driven by the rise of  new geopolitical 
zones of  confl ict, specifi cally the frictions between Pakistan and Afghanistan.31 The 
return of  Indira Gandhi to power in 1980 (and the country’s return, among other 
things, to a planned economy and nationalized banks, while at the same time accept-
ing International Monetary Fund loans) not only solidifi ed Indian-Soviet relations but 
also backgrounded India’s continuing support of  the Soviet invasion of  Afghanistan at 
the General Assembly of  United Nations in 1980.32 This historical overview helps us 
place the Indian-Soviet coproduction of  Ali Baba in its proper historical and political 
context—after all we are talking about a story about bandits (razboiniki), which soon 
became the Soviet military term for the mujahedin in Afghanistan. Such a reading is 
further justifi ed by the fact that the costumes of  the forty thieves in the fi lm coincide 
with the generic visual representation of  the “mountain warriors,” and unlike the cos-
tumes of  other characters in the fi lm are not marked as either Indian or Uzbek.
The Narrative.  In Alibaba, the famous forty thieves are led by a crafty chief, Abu 
Hassan (Rolan Bykov), who poses, in disguise, as the Vizier of  the town in which Ali 
Baba (Dharmendra) lives. Sim Sim is the female Jinn who inhabits the bandit cave 
and provides her master Abu Hassan (whom she refers to as her father) with power 
and advice. One day the bandits raid a caravan, kidnapping a man and his daughter, 
Fatima (Zeenat Aman). The daughter, negotiating with the bandits for her and her 
father’s freedom, helps them raid another caravan led by Ali Baba’s father, Yusuf, who 
has apparently been away from his family for years. Yusuf  survives, and recuperates at 
the Shah’s palace. Here, again, violence threatens when the Shah is overthrown just 
as Ali Baba is coming to take his long lost father home. He does manage to rescue his 
father and the Shah’s daughter, Marjina (Hema Malini), but just as Ali recognizes that 
the man he saved is his father, bandits attack again, Yusuf  is mortally wounded, and 
Marjina is captured and sold into slavery. During the bandit attacks the dam that holds 
the town’s water supply has been ruined. Ali Baba resolves to fi x the dam—which he 
does by organizing the town’s labor—and fi nd the bandits. To free Marjina, he bor-
rows the money from his brother in exchange for his part of  their father’s property, but 
when he does fi nd the bandit cave (following the story’s tradition) he uses the money 
he steals from the thieves to pay for the dam building. Then he tells the Vizier of  the 
town about his discovery. But, due to a ring that the Vizier is wearing on his fi nger, 
which was stolen by the bandit chief  from Ali Baba’s father, Ali deduces that the Vizier 
is really the bandit leader, Abu Hassan. The Vizier orders a celebration, but places the 
bandits in large jars, from which they are supposed to arise during the celebration to 
kill Ali Baba. But Ali now joins forces with Fatima, and while Marjina dances before 
the Vizier to distract him they kill all the bandits. Abu Hassan then attacks Ali, and 
when Fatima physically interposes herself, kills her. Abu Hassan then kidnaps Marjina 
and takes her to the cave. After subterfuges involving Abu Hassan’s magic, Ali Baba 
fi nally slays Abu Hassan and rescues his beloved Marjina.
31 Vinod Bhatia, Indira Gandhi and Indo-Soviet Relations (New Delhi: Panchsheel Publishers, 1987), 82–83.
32 Robert Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and Infl uence (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 182–183.
AU: Used the spelling listed online for the actual 
fi lm listing, Marjina. OK?
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The narrative of  Alibaba is apparently structured around two enigmas, which split 
into a series of  interwoven narrative strands; the two key mysteries (which turn out to 
be one and the same) are the identity of  the ruler, and the identity of  the father. This 
“doubling” and parallel structure is far from unusual for Indian cinema with its tradi-
tion of  Persianized narratives, including the so-called Islamicate romance narratives 
of  the 1930–1940s, which all share this interest in good and bad governance and the 
role of  female characters in recovering the good state. In fact, in many respects Alibaba 
with its endless string of  action stunts and fairy-tale adventure seems like a throwback 
to Fearless Nadia fi lms.33 Moreover, the doubling structure has become a staple of  
Indian melodrama and fundamental to the formation of  its star personae.34 In the 
case of  Alibaba, however, the doubling points not merely to the binary logic of  the 
melodramatic imagination but to the moral codes related to the patriarchal bourgeois 
family and state structure.35 The fi gure of  the father is in continual transit between the 
categories of  the literal, the metaphoric, and the metonymic. The “shifter” that em-
bodies these various regimes is Yusuf ’s ring, which functions both as Yusuf ’s signature 
and—through the copy of  it that Ali Baba possesses—Yusuf ’s way to recognize his 
son. The good biological fathers of  Ali, Marjina, and Fatima function in this natural 
order. Structurally, within the fi lm’s narrative, they function not so much as unique 
persons but rather as interchangeable markers of  authenticity and vulnerability. Each 
is overthrown. Each loses his possessions. Ali and Fatima’s fathers become dependent 
on their children and ultimately sacrifi ce their lives protecting them. On the other 
side is the Vizier, who presents himself  as “the father of  the people” both visually and 
verbally, and Abu Hassan, who is also the “father” of  the bandits. These fathers take 
on the properties of  the father, but are, in reality, fakes, simulacra. This is literalized 
in the fi nal scene of  the fi lm, where Ali is confronted with multiple refl ections of  Abu 
Hassan in the cave of  which he has to fi nd—and kill—the “real” Abu Hassan. The 
mediated quality of  this simulacrum is further underlined by the presence of  what ap-
pears to be a TV screen inside the cave, and by the repeated use of  superimpositions 
and time lapses. It is Abu Hassan’s possession of  Yusuf ’s ring, the instrument that joins 
together his identity as bandit leader and Vizier (and that also has unique cinematic 
powers, itself  acting at times as a mini-screen), which both places him in the position 
of  playing false father to Ali, and also provides the fatal clue to the falsity of  that posi-
tion, as the “true” Abu Hassan is the only one among the refl ections with the ring on. 
Stealing the symbol of  the good father reveals his true identity as the “false” (or “bad”) 
father to his people.
It is the fact that the nuclear (bourgeois) family as the basic unit constitutive of  
the modern state can be questioned and reconfi gured, just as the father’s identity, 
33 On Fearless Nadia fi lms, see Rosie Thomas, “Not Quite (Pearl) White: Fearless Nadia, Queen of the Stunts,” in Bol-
lywood: Popular Indian Cinema Through a Transnational Lens, eds. Raminder Kaur and Ajay Singa (London: Sage 
Publications, 2005), 35–43.
34 See Neepa Majumdar, “Doubling, Stardom, and Melodrama in Indian Cinema: The ‘Impossible’ Role of Nargis,” 
Post Script 22, no. 3 (2003): 89–103.
35 For an in-depth discussion of melodramatic codes in Indian cinema, see Ravi Vasudevan, “The Melodramatic Mode 
and the Commercial Hindi Cinema: Notes on Film History, Narrative and Performance in the 1950s,” Screen 30, 
no. 3 (1989): 29–50.
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dependent upon a ring, can potentially enter into a circulation of  counterfeits that al-
lows Abu Hassan to gain power. As natural relations are vulnerable, so, too, are those 
metaphorical relations, such as the fi gure of  the head of  the state. The fi lm not only 
follows the Oedipal narrative structure where the young hero’s maturity is signaled 
by eliminating the father and father-substitutes, but it also effectively gets rid of  the 
father-fi gures in the metaphoric domain, where they operate in relation to the com-
munity. In that sense, the real ending of  the fi lm would be the scene of  the arrange-
ment of  Abu Hassan’s murder, which is planned as a public event and involves all 
the members of  the community. This potential (and yet unrealized) ending reaffi rms 
the radically new formation of  the community and succeeds through an important 
symbolic event—an explosion of  violence that is not directed against but rather by 
the women in the fi lm, the rebellion of  the “daughters,” Fatima and Marjina. It 
is done through particularly spectacular and loaded formal means: as a song-and-
dance number. Up until that point in the fi lm, such numbers had been coded as 
performances of  the threat of  public humiliation and sexual violence against women. 
Here, however, consistent with Dyer’s famous argument, the genuinely liberatory 
utopian dimension of  mass entertainment fi nds its clearest manifestation through 
music and movement.36 However, this turns to be a false ending, and is at its actual 
conclusion—Ali’s fi ght with Abu Hassan in the cave—that the fi lm reverts to the very 
traditional Oedipal ending that reconstitutes the couple enabling for the creation of  
the (bourgeois) family.
While this actual ending closes off  the more radical possibilities in the fi lm’s alle-
gorical meaning, the culminating moment shifts to that of  discovering the “authentic” 
Abu Hassan from among the myriads of  “fakes,” an act of  recognition made possible 
by means of  the ring once possessed by the authentic father, Yusuf. It seems that of  
the forty images of  himself  that Abu Hassan magically projects, only one wears the 
father’s ring. In the dream logic of  this sequence, the space of  the cave and the ring 
are both invested with magical powers of  projection, which are of  course parallel to 
cinema’s own power to reveal as well as to deceive. Thus the narrative doubling co-
incides not only with the inherently cinematic simultaneity of  presence and absence, 
identifi cation and disavowal, but also with the potential of  entertainment cinema to 
create false consciousness (to “deceive” the viewer ideologically) and reveal genuine 
collective anxieties and liberatory solutions alike.
The Threat of Infl ation.  Alibaba’s narrative and visual preoccupation with false iden-
tities and images can also be linked to a historically specifi c anxiety about infl ation, 
both economic and symbolic. The anxiety of  the possibility of  endless counterfeiting 
and therefore further devaluation of  currency is manifested here in this trope of  “real” 
versus “fake” father, further linking the political structure to the economic one. And 
like the economic infl ation, the symbolic infl ation of  the fi gures of  the state was hid-
den and never acknowledged in the stagnation period (of  the 1970s and early 1980s) in 
the Soviet Union. The devaluation of  social and political symbols from any meaning 
showed, increasingly, that only raw force held the system together.
36 Dyer, 17–34.
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In terms of  economic development, the late 1970s was a time of  anxiety about the 
issue of  privatization in India, and a time of  anxiety about hidden infl ation linked to 
the rise of  commodity culture in the Soviet Union. In particular, as credit was squeezed 
and prices became uncontrollable, the notion that a centralized, superior sector could 
plan the economy began to lose credibility. In the fi lm, however, “the private sphere” 
is disavowed in all its manifestations. Two images from the fi lm emerge to balance 
each other here: one is the village water supply and the dam, which is threatened with 
privatization; the other is the cave with its treasures, in which the central transforma-
tions take place. Such a paradoxical doubling of  the internal and external spaces is, 
of  course, a traditional marker of  meaning in melodrama.37 But in its recourse to the 
dam as the image that stands for the public sector threatened by privatization, the fi lm 
is consistent with the moment when India started its massive efforts of  irrigation which 
involved the construction of  hundreds of  large dams. In the enthusiasm of  the initial 
period of  decolonialization, dam and water projects were considered the keystones 
of  modernity. Finally, many of  the fi lms locales were shot in Uzbekistan, which is an 
ironic coincidence: a fairy-tale fi lm about the misuse of  water was shot in a place and 
time in which the misuse of  water—namely, the water from the Aral Sea, to irrigate 
cotton crops in Uzbekistan—was creating one of  the greatest environmental scandals 
and frauds in Soviet history.38
At the same time, Alibaba offers a dream vision, a premodern community in which 
the problems of  an ossifi ed governing class and an unruly populace are solved by 
a magical return to the local and yet multiethnic pan-Asian community, a vision of  
mythological premodern pan-Asian unity as an alternative to the modern political 
and economic structures (either capitalist or state socialist per se). Thus the fi lm sutures 
together a popular utopian impulse for a better, alternative future while affi rming the 
state ideologies of  countries that backed its production. However, at the same time 
as the fi lm encodes the rejection of  representation or mediation between the people 
and the state, it betrays a profound anxiety about the fragility of  its state apparatus and 
the violence which it yields. This reading fully affi rms Madhava Prasad’s statement 
that “what the allegorical dimension of  the text of  the fi lm represents is the continu-
ing necessity to conceive the state form which could serve as the ground for cultural 
signifi cation. This allegorical scaffolding registers the instability of  the cultural and 
political reality/practice itself  and hence the possibility of  struggles over the state.”39 
It is in this spirit that the state can be reconstituted, installing the possibility of  change 
in the power structure.
In Alibaba, the multiplication of  the father threatens the very idea that there is an 
authentic father, thus questioning the very foundations of  the social power structure. 
The role of  the identity of  the father as constitutive of  the family feudal romance 
structure is above all to mark the centrality of  patrilinear descent intended to facilitate 
37 See, for example, Christine Gledhill, “Signs of Melodrama,” in Stardom: Industry of Desire, ed. Christine Gledhill 
(London: Routledge, 1991), 107–131.
38 William A. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Offi cialdom (New York: M. E. Sharp, 1993), 187–190.
39 M. Madhava Prasad, Ideology of the Hindi Film (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 9.
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the legitimate heritage of  both property and power.40 At the same time, it is central 
to marking sexual boundaries, defi ning licit and illicit sexual relations. This process 
guarantees the continuity of  economic, social, and political power within the feu-
dal state and its stability. In the fi lm, however, this lineage is symbolically redrawn 
across the lines of  biological family and, furthermore, local and ethnic lines. Ali and 
Marjina symbolically exchange parentage as Ali’s father becomes a substitute father 
to Marjina when her own father is murdered, while Marjina’s biological father, on 
the other hand, has previously acted as the protector of  Ali’s father by saving his life. 
This “exchange of  fathers” exhibits a utopian impulse, allowing for the formation of  
a community different from the nuclear (bourgeois) family and national unity alike. 
Through the exchange of  the fathers that brings together Ali, Marjin, and Fatima, 
a pseudo-familial communal unit is formed, which crosses over class and local com-
munity boundaries: Ali is from a merchant family presumably near Bukhara; Marjina 
is a Hindustani princess (as marked in particular by the elephants that form part of  
the courtly entourage, her clothes, and her dancing); and Fatima is the daughter of  a 
wealthy merchant and, judging by the reference to Bahrestan, she is of  Persian origins 
(or generally of  “foreign lands”). This again alludes to a formation of  a post-nation 
state by means of  resorting to a pre-nation state culture and renegotiating the lines of  
lineage within it. Of  course, the Soviet Union was offi cially founded as a post-national 
state, in accordance to Marxist internationalism and the rejection of  the nation-state 
as imperialist. The crossing of  ethnicities and the return to a lineage entailed by the 
choice of  this story from the Arabian Nights casts a certain light on the anxiety over 
the violence that could disturb the post nation-state states, as central planning withers 
and local communities are left to either fend for themselves or become prey to preda-
tor states. However, like any pseudo-familial community, the pseudo-family of  Alibaba 
remains bound by its underlying patriarchal structure and is thus always shadowed 
by the question of  the real father. Yusuf ’s ring, then, plays a complex role in the 
sequence of  discoveries and narrative twists, playing a key role in the melodramatic 
family feudal romance structure—a structure that governs much of  Indian traditional 
narrative.
If  this new community is fused through an exchange of  fathers, one that ultimately 
returns to patriarchal lineage as its essence, the new community’s bond is sealed over 
the expulsion of  the wicked Father, whose very wickedness is defi ned by his ability to 
play the “fake” patriarch. The Father position, it turns out, is vulnerable to counterfeit-
ing, to parasites and tricksters. Just as currency is susceptible to infl ation, the father-
position may turn out to be empty. And given the importance of  the iconography of  
the time representing Indira Gandhi as “Mother India”—the title of  another tragic 
and utopian fi lm about dam construction as a foundation for national identity—the 
absence of  mothers as authority fi gures in the fi lm (as opposed to the dominance 
of  mother fi gures in such classical family melodramas of  the period as Deewar [Yash 
Chopra, 1975]) is also particularly conspicuous.
40 See Ravi Vasudevan, ed., Making Meaning in Indian Cinema (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 99–142; 
and Vijay Mishra, Bollywood Cinema: Temples of Desire (New York: Routledge, 2002), 38.
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It is also emblematic of  the mixed generic origins of  the fi lm, which fuses melodra-
matic feudal family romance with socialist realism, such that all the fathers die sacrifi c-
ing themselves for their children: Fatima’s father commits suicide in hopes of  liberating 
her from captivity, Marjina’s father dies protecting her honor (and by extension the 
future of  the kingdom and desirable lineage), and Ali’s father is killed protecting both 
Ali and Marjina. This fundamental element of  the narrative goes counter to the well-
established Indian cinematic tradition of  self-sacrifi cing mothers. This theme of  mar-
tyred fathers instead resonates with the conventions of  socialist realism, in which the 
hero is often “adopted” by a communal body (the army or the party) while the father-
fi gure (the more enlightened member of  the party who serves as his mentor) dies facing 
the class enemy, which serves to allow the hero to take his symbolic place. This formula 
at the time of  its origins (in the 1930s) represented the offi cial legend, behind which 
the Stalinist repressions made it the case that any member of  any community could 
“disappear” at any time, or could lose his/her status as a citizen and hence as a legally 
recognized member of  the collective. At the same time, as Katerina Clark has argued, 
the party structure at work in the socialist realist narrative reproduces/replaces the 
family patriarchy, regardless of  the gender of  the actual members of  the community; 
in the semiotic space in which a son, as in Gorky’s Mother, can take the place of  the “fa-
ther fi gure” to his own mother, gender is an invisible element of  socialist patriarchy.41 
With another recognizable socialist realist touch, Ali’s father refuses to take his last sip 
of  water because it was bought—that is, turned into a commodity and privatized. But 
perhaps an even more recognizable to the Soviet audiences gesture is that of  the Vizier 
positioning himself  as the Father of  the People—which is emphasized pictorially over 
and over by him picking up children in a quasi-Stalinist gesture, one we can almost 
surely attribute to the actor, Rolan Bykov, who had a long history of  battles on- and 
offscreen with some of  the conventions of  socialist realism and played an important 
role in the history of  popular Soviet cinema, both as an actor and a director.
Bykov, who was almost unrecognizable to the Soviet audiences in this performance, 
managed to blend in very well to the Bollywood fi lm genre. His fi lm career in the 
Soviet Union often thrust him into fi lms of  eccentric and exaggerated theatricality, for 
which he became famous. Yet those fi lms are now almost forgotten, and international 
fi lmgoers know him more for his extraordinary dramatic roles in Commissar and Andrei 
Rublev, both eccentric tragic performances in highly controversial fi lms by auteur fi lm-
makers. Bykov’s legacy is very complex and is only now, years after his death, becom-
ing available to fi lm historians.42 In addition to his contributions as a remarkable actor, 
he directed a number of  highly original children’s fi lms. In his most famous fi lm of  that 
period, Oh How It Hurts 66 (Aybolit-66, 1968), Bykov stars as the main villain, giving a 
memorable performance as the pathetic philistine, Barmalei, a familiar boogeyman to 
all children of  the last Soviet generation, hinting at the relationship between political 
power and the state (these undertones were made even more explicit in the intended 
41 Katerina Clark, “Socialist Realism with Shores: The Conventions for the Positive Hero,” in Socialist Realism Without 
Shores, eds. Thomas Lahusen and Evgeny Dobrenko (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 27–50.
42 See Alexander Prokhorov, “Arresting Development: A Brief History of Soviet Cinema for Children and Adolescents,” 
in Russian Children’s Literature and Culture, eds. Marina Balina and Larissa Rudova (London: Routledge, 2007). 
129–152.
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follow-up to the fi lm, which was aborted by the state censors). His next children’s 
fi lm, Attention, Turtle! (Vnimanie, cherepakha! 1970), was severely criticized for its climatic 
scene where children rescue a turtle from the wheels of  a tank—the scene was taken 
to be an allusion to the 1968 Soviet invasion of  Czechoslovakia. Further, scenes of  
children playing irreverently with toy soldiers were accused of  communicating a mes-
sage mocking patriotism and the Soviet military (one newspaper ran a review with the 
headline, “Flag Covered in Urine”).43
Bykov’s struggles with the offi cial censorship and his participation in the banned 
fi lms were well-known to the Soviet audiences, making his performance in Ali Baba 
even more politically evocative for them. His appearance in the fi lm is itself  coded, 
making implicit the connection between the dual role Bykov plays and the Soviet au-
dience’s understanding of  the political power of  the state. In this double role he estab-
lishes a continuum between robbery, private enterprise, and state corruption, linking 
the two spaces of  the fi lm that he controls—the dam and the cave.
Given the dominance of  this motif, I would argue that the political climax of  the 
fi lm is the scene of  the public exposure of  the identity of  Abu Hassan and the Vizier. 
In this scene, done as a song-and-dance number, Marjina’s dance with knives is a 
symbolic enactment of  the killing of  Bykov’s character, while his real strength is being 
secretly sapped by Ali and Fatima, who dispatch the forty thieves. What is particularly 
striking about this sequence is its peculiar violence, which this time is turned around 
and manifested by Marjina, the most fragile and feminine character in the fi lm. Her 
provocative dance with the knives, intercut with Fatima’s actual violence toward her 
former captors, makes more explicit than elsewhere in the fi lm the centrality of  women 
in the symbolic cluster through which the logic of  the fi lm unfolds. Women in the fi lm 
fi gure as treasures and commodities, sold and bought, traded and stolen, as objects of  
exchange in the patriarchic lineage of  fathers and sons, but also as the bodies upon 
which is inscribed both the violence of  the state and the violence of  those outside the 
state. In turn, they take on the role of  avenging the good fathers against the “bad” 
fathers. In what follows I will explore the representation of  women through its enact-
ment in the song-and-dance numbers in the fi lm, with reference to the performance 
history of  one of  the fi lm’s stars, Zeenat Aman.
Sexual violence is a constant undercurrent in the fi lm: the world of  Alibaba is one 
in which a woman’s honor (and life) is constantly threatened. Rape is the social bond 
that welds together the false family of  thieves, which, by extension, is the false, or other 
community mirroring the town over which the Vizier rules. The violence to which the 
state has recourse gets played out on the woman’s body, as is typical in melodrama, 
where the body becomes the framework of  all meaning. The fi gure in the fi lm that 
best embodies this both narratively and through her on-screen performance history is 
Zeenat Aman.
Zeenat Aman, Sexual Violence, and the Conventions of Song-and-Dance 
Numbers.  Zeenat Aman was the fi rst Indian star who wasn’t a good dancer, who 
refused a bouffant. She bobbed her hair at the height of  her career and hardly ever 
43 “Rolan Bykov,” http://www.peoples.ru/art/cinema/producer/bykov/index.html (accessed September 11, 2009).
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appeared in saris and bindis. Her specialty was the modern urban Indian woman, who 
made no excuses and took no prisoners. Zeenat began a new trend, helping launch 
careers for male actors—something Indian actresses had never done.44 She starred 
in a number of  socially conscious fi lms, most notably as the avenger-woman in Insaf  
Ka Tarazu (B. R. Chopra, 1980), the fi rst fi lm in the genre, in which she portrayed a 
rape victim who, failing to receive justice from a court that doubted that she did not 
consent to having sex with her attacker, took her own personal revenge on him. The 
success of  this “notorious rape fi lm” was described as largely due to Zeenat Aman’s 
performance (as well as the larger conditions of  its reception in the wake of  femi-
nist activism of  the 1970s), and thus began the genre of  avenger-woman fi lms.45 Her 
roles in Insaf  Ka Tarazu and Alibaba resonate with the themes of  sexual violence and 
the “avenging woman” (in this case coded specifi cally as Muslim) for which her later, 
more famous, performances would be known. But while Zeenat’s Fatima is consis-
tently coded as a “dangerous” woman, Hema Malini’s Marjina is her “good” sister (a 
common doubling for Indian fi lms) who for most of  the fi lm is represented through 
passive and unthreatening femininity. A sudden change occurs when Marjina comes 
into close contact with Fatima, whose presence seems to be contaminating. Hema 
Malini’s expectedly violent performance in the last song-and-dance number in Alibaba 
seems to belong not so much to that fi lm as to one of  her later fi lms, standing out from 
Alibaba’s clear set of  stock and utterly predictable characters. While the earlier song-
and-dance numbers by Hema Malini in the fi lm are very similar in their masochistic 
psychodynamics to, say, her famous dance on broken glass in Sholay, the fi nal dance 
with the knives clearly, symbolically reverses the direction of  violence, making a bridge 
from her earlier roles of  spunky but ultimately unthreatening Basanti (Sholay; Ramesh 
Sippy, 1975) and Geeta (Seeta Aur Geeta, Sippy, 1972) to her roles as an avenging woman 
from the 1980s fi lms.
Given the kinds of  characters Aman had played, and those she would later play, 
we can see how sexual violence crystallizes as a key motif  of  Alibaba. In folk narratives, 
women are often treated as units of  exchange, yet the refusals of  the women in the 
fi lm to accept that fate, which provokes physical and sexual threats, becomes a major 
driver of  the narrative progression—crucially in Fatima’s willingness to cooperate with 
her thief  captors in order to save herself  and her father, and in Badshah’s decision 
to take Marjina by force by killing her father. The theme comes through even more 
forcefully in the song-and-dance numbers, which stop the narrative action and present 
themselves as pure spectacle.
In Alibaba every single song-and-dance number is framed through the threat of  
some form of  gendered violence. On the one hand, this isn’t particularly unusual: 
near-rape scenes have long been standard in Bollywood fi lms. On a simple level, just 
like the inclusion of  harem scenes, such scenes allow for a narratively justifi ed display 
of  nudity and sexual titillation while preserving intact the moral code’s insistence that 
a woman’s honor is at stake in guarding herself  from sexual contact, even to the point 
44 “Altekar, Parshwanath Yeshwant,” in Encyclopedia of Indian Cinema, by Ashish Rajadhyaksha and Paul Willemen 
(London: British Film Institute, 1999), 41.
45 See Lalitha Gopalan, Cinema of Interruptions, chapter two.
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of  risking death. However, it is unusual that every single song-and-dance number in 
Alibaba is framed this way. What is absent, for example, is a “happy couple” song-and-
dance number. The narrative importance of  the subversive potential of  a sexually 
abused woman is signaled by the words of  Sim Sim (who herself  is a captive, albeit 
a powerful one) who warns Abu Hassan that he is going to be destroyed by a woman 
(a warning that lingers of  the narrative but is not realized literally, as it is in the end 
Ali Baba who kills Abu Hassan). The overemphasis on sexual violence from the very 
beginning of  the fi lm foregrounds such violence as a structuring motif  of  both the plot 
and its cinematic representation. The use of  the cave brings out, as well, the tradition 
of  “Indian gothic,” which establishes the foundational staging of  melodrama with a 
set of  stereotypical scenarios and settings, bringing attention to what Mishra calls “the 
central themes of  the gothic—the idea of  claustral and confi ned space as the meta-
phor of  the unconscious in the dark passages . . . the terror that this space creates, the 
absence of  transcendence, the threat of  sexual violation.”46 The settings of  the cave 
provide a stage which allows for the usual conventions of  staging and editing of  the 
time: frontal composition and direct address, lack of  the 180 degree rule and, given 
that the cave seems to consist of  interdependent spaces providing for only partially 
coherent spacial organization, parallel editing within the short segment, a technique 
which will be used again and to great effect in the last song-and-dance number of  the 
fi lm. In a striking moment, the fl oor of  the cave where Fatima is dancing lights up 
and turns into a disco fl oor, an anachronistic moment further marking the space of  
the cave as the space of  display and of  a particular kind of  a recognizable sexualized 
performance. The next song-and-dance number features Marjina (again in a captive 
situation) forced—and refusing—to dance for the new Badshah as a token of  her sub-
jugation and humiliation, and managing to escape only through the trick, engineered 
by Ali, of  a provocative, mirage image of  a false Marjina. The following number is 
staged at the slave market, where Marjina is singing to Ali to rescue her while she is 
being forced to undress. The penultimate song-and-dance number is under a double 
sexual threat, where Marjina and Fatima team up to ward off  the sexual advances and 
threat of  physical violence coming from several directions.
Only the fi nal song-and-dance number is not a scene of  a woman’s performance 
as an attempt to ward off  a sexual menace. Instead, this number depicts a double 
revenge. Marjina simulates the murder of  Vizier by dancing with knives and fi re, and 
this is crosscut with Fatima and Ali actually killing the bandits. In fact, each move-
ment of  Marjina’s dance is intercut with a false match-on-action; with each strike of  
Marjina’s knives, there is a cut to Ali and Fatima killing the bandits.
This constant confl ation of  sadomasochistic gender dynamics (and actual violence) 
with dance and sexuality further foregrounds the avenger theme as a particular ob-
session. The decision to frame the song-and-dance numbers in terms of  contexts of  
violence directed against women further erodes the difference between rape and sexu-
alized representation of  women, mixing two codes: one code being the antirealistic 
conventions in which the visual pleasure of  the spectator derives solely from the display 
of  the woman as a sexual object in the traditional song-and-dance number, and the 
46 Mishra, Bollywood Cinema, 49.
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other centering on the sexual aggressor’s pleasure in being titillated. This association 
is made even more explicit by the intrusion of  a thoroughly modern element, a disco 
fl oor, into the space of  the ancient cave, framing Fatima’s song-and-dance number 
explicitly as a performance, and a thoroughly modern one at that. Thus, the spectato-
rial pleasure with which the fi lm engages us throughout is put into a clear relationship 
to the constant threat of  sexual violence against the heroines. Gopalan makes the 
same observation in describing the interplay of  the conventions of  disrobing in Indian 
cinema as they are employed in the rape scenes.47 I would argue, however, that this 
example of  incorporating near-rape into the musical number makes this relationship 
between the representation of  gender and depictions of  rape even more obvious.
This equation is particularly signifi cant given the traditional alignment between the 
spectatorial gaze in Indian cinema with the state (both in its censoring capacities, and 
as a formal structure of  the gaze, as argued for example by Madhava Prasad), which is 
paralleled, I would argue, in the Soviet tradition. The state, then, becomes the editor 
of  last resort, enters the frame as both the censor of  cinematic pleasure and, by the 
parameters of  decorum it enforces, the condition for the more and more eccentric 
forms of  sadomasochistic spectacle it activates.
Here I should note a further tie between the state and sexual violence that comes 
out of  the double role of  the Vizier/Abu Hassan. In both domains in which the dou-
ble fi gure operates—as the representative of  the state and of  the counterfeit thieves’ 
state—Abu Hassan presents an impression of  potential sexual aggression. This vio-
lence in turn is also implicitly connected with capitalist commodifi cation and privati-
zation. First a link is established between slavery and prostitution through the parallel 
of  the two numbers—the fi rst one in which Fatima is selling herself  in order to avoid 
being gang raped by the bandits (singing “the one who will give the most for me can 
have me”) being mirrored by the second one, Marjina’s singing while being displayed 
for sale at the slave market (“today your love is sold on the street”). The privatization 
of  water, Ali’s father’s death (from refusing to pay for water), Marjina’s sexual enslave-
ment, and Ali’s sale of  his birthright to his brother to buy her out of  slavery are clearly 
metonymically linked. All of  these elements are conditioned by the transformation 
of  a public good—water—into a private good, and the greed such a transformation 
introduces. Thus, the issue of  commodifi cation and its link to the representation of  
women (performing, dancing, and singing on and off  disco fl oors) is as much at the 
core of  the fi lm as its preoccupation with the Father and state. The two themes come 
fully together, fully illustrating Lalitha Gopalan’s argument that avenging-woman fi lms 
“feed off  the crisis of  legitimacy of  the Indian state, a crisis that unleashed an open 
display of  the state’s coercive powers and precipitated most visibly after the state of  
emergency between 1975 and 1977. . . . [The state of  emergency] set into motion 
contestations between power and authority which have pressed upon a more thorough 
exploration of  hegemony, citizenship, community, nationalism, and democracy in In-
dia. [These fi lms] stage some of  the most volatile struggles over representation that 
shape our public and private fantasies of  national, communal, regional, and sexual 
47 Lalitha Gopalan, “Avenging Women in Indian Cinema,” in Vasudevan, Making Meaning in Indian Cinema,” 219.
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identities.”48 In retrospect, the particular cluster of  anxieties the fi lm symbolically 
portrays—of  the simultaneous fragility and oppressive potential of  the state appara-
tus, of  the instability and unsustainability of  the top-down economic system and at the 
same time of  the dangers that commodity fetishism posed to local communities, of  the 
multi-ethnic confl icts on the brink of  complete disaster and the threat of  nationalism 
as the ultimate solution to these problems—all became historically justifi ed within less 
than a decade of  the making of  the fi lm. In addition to being an example of  the exces-
sive pleasures of  1970s Bollywood and a product of  a fragile but powerful geopolitical 
alliance, Alibaba remains a rare cultural document of  shared transnational and trans-
cultural anxieties and dreams. 
48 Ibid., 215–216.
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